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INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Paul Little was tried on obscenity charges in the
Middle District of Florida.1 Little operated a pornographic website
*
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in California.2 Department of Justice agents in Tampa captured
and downloaded five trailers from and ordered and received five
DVDs by mail from the website, providing a basis to charge Little
in that jurisdiction.3 Little was convicted of violating federal
obscenity laws and sentenced to forty-six months in prison.4
Little‘s conviction raises questions about key elements of
obscenity law. According to Miller v. California,5 the question of
what constitutes obscenity is answered by a jury, using
―contemporary community standards,‖ which are understood to be
local.6 The same website that might be considered obscene by a
jury in Tampa might not be considered obscene by a jury in Los
Angeles, for example.
The Miller test originated in an era when most obscenity was
distributed via postal mail and it was relatively easy to direct
content at specific parts of the country and not others.7 In contrast,
today obscenity is largely transmitted over the Internet, which
generally cannot be directed at specific geographic locations.8
Accordingly, judges and scholars have argued that a national
standard is necessary to avoid subjecting Internet distributors to
every local standard in the country.9 Otherwise, content providers
will be faced with a race to the bottom in which providers must

1

United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 159–60 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the
ruling of the district court).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 161.
4
Id.
5
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
6
Id. at 30, 39.
7
Lawrence G. Walters & Clyde DeWitt, Obscenity in the Digital Age: The ReEvaluation of Community Standards, 10 NEXUS 59, 64 (2005) (―[T]he community
standards test was developed at a time when obscenity prosecutions were primarily
localized in nature and distributors intentionally chose the geographic areas in which they
distributed or displayed their material.‖).
8
Bret Boyce, Obscenity and Community Standards, 33 YALE J. INT‘L L. 299, 347
(2008) (―[I]t is still not possible for a website operator to restrict access only to certain
jurisdictions . . . .‖).
9
E.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009); Clay Calvert,
The End of Forum Shopping in Internet Obscenity Cases? The Ramifications of the Ninth
Circuit’s Groundbreaking Understanding of Community Standards in Cyberspace, 89
NEB. L. REV. 47, 80 (2010).
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follow the standards of the most puritanical community in the
nation.10
Part I of this note considers the origins and development of
modern obscenity law. The keystone of this development is the
Supreme Court‘s 2002 decision in Ashcroft v. ACLU, 11 which
centered on indecency aimed at children on the Internet. Ashcroft
concerned the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA), which placed restrictions on material made available or
communications to minors on the Internet that could be considered
harmful.12 The Court considered whether variations in community
standards made COPA overbroad when applied to the internet.13
The Ashcroft case became centrally important in a series of
prosecutions of Internet adult obscenity during the Bush
administration.14 In United States v. Little, the Eleventh Circuit
upheld Little‘s conviction, rejecting the argument that a national
community standard is necessary in Internet obscenity cases.15
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result in United States v.
Kilbride, involving an obscenity conviction arising from images
within an email-spamming operation.16 Relying on Ashcroft, the
Kilbride court ruled that the use of a local standard was an error
and that a national community standard should have been used.17
Part II of this note identifies a series of policy arguments
underlying the different community standards and obscenity law
more generally. On the one hand, the community standards test
raises serious constitutional concerns related to due process,
vagueness, and overbreadth.18 On the other hand, there is a strong
motivation for prosecuting obscenity, which may be amplified by
10

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 590 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (―[A]dopting
the community standards of every locality in the United States would provide the most
puritan of communities with a heckler‘s Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation.‖).
11
535 U.S. 564, 564 (2002).
12
Id. at 569–70.
13
Id. at 571–72.
14
See, e.g., United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159 (11th Cir. 2010); Kilbride, 584
F.3d 1240, 1252 (9th Cir. 2009).
15
See Little, 365 F. App‘x at 164.
16
Kilbride, 583 F.3d at 1240.
17
Id. at 1254–55.
18
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 45–46 (1973) (Douglas, J., Dissenting).
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the new threats posed by the Internet.19 Moreover, the way one
defines the community standard may not make a significant
difference to the outcomes of obscenity prosecutions.20
Part III of this note focuses on proposals to remedy this
disparate treatment by courts of the community standard. First, the
Ashcroft case is applicable only to cases involving obscenity
directed at minors; the analysis for adult obscenity is inherently
different.21 The justices in Ashcroft did not intend the holding in
that case to apply to obscenity directed at adults, and Ninth
Circuit‘s interpretation of Ashcroft put forward in Kilbride is
incorrect. Second, from a policy perspective, choosing between a
national and a local standard is unlikely to rectify the current
problems with obscenity jurisprudence or unfair treatment of
pornography producers.22 Finally, technological advancements
allowing for a more accurate or restricted distribution of goods on
the Internet may be the most effective solution.23 Ultimately,
however, even with improvements in technology, courts must
clearly and once-and-for-all address the function of the community
standard, and perhaps the very concept of the obscenity exception
to the First Amendment.

19

See, e.g., John Fee, Obscenity and the World Wide Web, 2007 BYU L. Rev. 1691,
1701–04 (2007).
20
See, e.g., Randolph Stuart Sergent, The “Hamlet” Fallacy: Computer Networks and
the Geographic Roots of Obscenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 715–17
(1996).
21
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 587 (2002) (O‘Connor, J., concurring)
(―[T]his case still leaves open the possibility that the use of local community standards
will cause problems for regulation of obscenity on the Internet, for adults . . . in future
cases.‖).
22
See Sergent, supra note 20, at 715–17.
23
Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001,
at G1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/15/technology/welcome-to-theweb-passport-please.html.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Overview
Obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment.24 Early
American obscenity law utilized a variety of legal tests to
determine whether a work was obscene, including the Hicklin test,
which focused on the ability of the material to corrupt ―particularly
sensitive individuals.‖25 During the early Twentieth Century
forfeiture actions against works such as James Joyce‘s Ulysses
were brought based on obscenity.26 In subsequent years, the
Supreme Court justices had considerable difficulty establishing a
consensus on how to define obscenity.27 During this period the
justices frequently reviewed materials personally to determine if
the materials were obscene.28 The Court finally reached a
consensus in 1973 when it adopted the Miller test,29 but
determining the meaning, breadth, and applicability of the Miller
test has plagued courts ever since.
In the period following Miller, the government had in many
ways lost the battle over obscenity to the pornography industry,
and the test is generally understood to be defendant-friendly.30
However, the George W. Bush presidency brought renewed focus
to obscenity and engaged in an ambitious campaign of
prosecutions targeting producers of obscene material.31 As a
statutory matter, obscenity is criminalized under state laws and a

24

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (―There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.‖).
25
See Boyce, supra note 8, at 311–13.
26
Id. at 314–15. See United States v. One Book Called ―Ulysses,‖ 5 F. Supp. 182
(S.D.N.Y. 1933).
27
See id.
28
See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 71 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that Douglas never chose to act as a censor in this manner because
he did not think it was constitutional for him to do so).
29
Boyce, supra note 8, at 318.
30
Fee, supra note 19, at 1695.
31
See Boyce, supra note 8, at 324; see also Calvert, supra note 9, at 75 (questioning
whether President Barack Obama would continue the ―crackdown on obscenity launched
during the administration of President George W. Bush‖).
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number of federal laws, targeting such offenses as the distribution
of obscenity via postal mail and transportation of obscenity via
interstate commerce or interactive computer network affecting
such commerce.32 Accordingly, the Bush Administration Justice
Department was able to bring cases in districts of its choosing and
prosecute Internet pornography producers in the ―least tolerant
communities,‖ thus avoiding litigation in the pornography
industry‘s home-base of California.33 Outside of obscenity
doctrine, the community standards test continues to be applied in
other areas of First Amendment jurisprudence.34
Currently, the job of defining the category of obscene material
falls to the states.35 In discharging this duty, states face two
distinct standards: one for obscene material directed at adults and
another for obscene material directed at children.36 In Ginsberg v.
New York,37 the Supreme Court concluded that material that may
be sold to adults may not necessarily be sold to children and
reiterated that ―the concept of obscenity or of unprotected matter
may vary according to the group to whom the questionable
material is directed.‖38
32

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1465 (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 847.011 (West 2008); United
States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010).
33
Calvert, supra note 9, at 64, 85.
34
See, e.g., Brown v. Entm‘t Merchs. Ass‘n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2746 (2011); United
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1588–90 (2010).
35
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (―State statutes designed to
regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we now confine the
permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct.
That conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law, as written or
authoritatively construed.‖).
36
Compare Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (defining the test for what constitutes obscene
material), with Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 659–60 (2004) (questioning the
constitutionality of COPA, a congressional statute designed to protect minors from
potentially harmful material online).
37
390 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1968) (holding that the New York State Legislature‘s ―power
to employ variable concepts of obscenity‖ in denying minors‘ access to material
condemned under statutory law did not ―invade[] the area of freedom of expression
constitutionally secured to minors.‖).
38
Id. at 636 (quoting Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671 (N.Y. 1966)).
Moreover, the Court also distinguished between the test for determining obscene material
directed at minors and child pornography. Compare Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656,
661–62 (2004), with New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982) (―The Miller
standard, like all general definitions of what may be banned as obscene, does not reflect
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B. The Community Standards Approach
Miller v. California established the current test for obscenity.39
Under the Miller test, the trier of fact determines
(a) whether the ―average person, applying
contemporary community standards‖ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.40
The Court indicated that these standards should be local as
opposed to national:
[O]ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for
this Court to reasonably expect that such standards
could be articulated for all 50 states in a single
formulation . . . . It is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment
as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable
in Las Vegas, or New York City.41
The first prong of the test emphasizes that the First
Amendment was designed to protect works of serious value, not
―hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake,‖ and that states have a
the State‘s particular and more compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the
sexual exploitation of children.‖). See also Fee, supra note 19, at 1696 (explaining that
the Supreme Court found it necessary in Ferber to hold that child pornography was
uncategorically protected because of the difficulty experienced by the states and the
Federal Government in prosecuting obscenity post-Miller). Child pornography is not
protected by the First Amendment and therefore is not subject to the community
standards approach set forth in Miller. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; Fee, supra note 19, at
1696–97.
39
413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973).
40
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
41
Id. at 30, 32. The Miller case itself involved contemporary community standards of
the state of California. Id. at 31.
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right to regulate such material to protect public morals.42 The first
prong requires that the work appeal to the prurient interest as
determined by contemporary community standards. The reference
to contemporary community standards clarified that ―obscenity is
not [to be] judged by the sensitivities of the most easily offended
individuals or by the morals of the past,‖ but rather that juries
should play the role of ―representatives of the various communities
from which they come.‖43 The Miller test‘s reliance on the
application of different community standards is particularly unique
in American jurisprudence because the treatment of constitutional
rights generally does not vary from one geographic area to another.
The second prong reinforces the community approach by
permitting the states to individually determine which sexual
conduct they find patently offensive.44 On the same day as Miller,
the Court decided in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton that Georgia
could prohibit the showing of obscene movies in an adult movie
theater.45 The Court highlighted the States‘ ―long-recognized
legitimate interest‖ in regulating obscene material, based on
notions of decency, quality of life, total community environment,
the tone of commerce, and public safety.46
The third prong of the Miller test addresses the potential impact
the test may have on First Amendment-protected speech. The
Supreme Court included the third prong to narrow the regulation of
obscenity, ―so as not to chill works of serious social value.‖47
Post-Miller, the Supreme Court clarified that whether the work in
fact has serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value is
determined from the perspective of a reasonable person, rather than
a juror in a given community.48
One year after Miller, the Court reviewed an obscenity
prosecution which had been decided before the Miller ruling was

42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Fee, supra note 19, at 1694 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 35).
Id. at 1695.
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–25.
413 U.S. 49, 55, 57–59, 69–70 (1973).
Id. at 57–59.
Id. at 1694.
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).
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announced.49 The defendants had used the mail to distribute
advertisements and copies of a book entitled ―The Illustrated
Presidential Report of the Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography.‖50 To determine whether the publication contained
obscene material, the trial court judge instructed the jury to
consider ―the standards generally held throughout this country.‖51
In its review, the Court found that use of a national standard did
not constitute reversible error, despite the fact that Miller calls for
a local standard.52 In his dissent, Justice Brennan responded to the
majority‘s affirmation of the local standard set out in Miller and
raised the concern that the use of a local standard would force
producers to cabin their creations within the standard of the most
restrictive community where their goods may travel, potentially
leading to self-censorship.53
Brennan‘s concern is particularly showcased by the numerous
forum options for prosecutors in determining where to try an
obscenity case. Obscenity prosecutions can be tried in the
community where the obscene material is purchased, where the
material is produced, or where the producer is primarily located.54
In 1982, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Florida obscenity
conviction of a Los Angeles producer who sent content via the
mail to an undercover FBI agent operating in Florida.55 The court
confirmed that the use of common carriers to ship obscene
materials is a continuing offense in every judicial district through

49
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 96 (1974). The defendants were indicted in
1971 and later convicted. Id. at 91. The 9th Circuit affirmed on June 7, 1973. Id. at 97.
Miller v. California was decided on June 21 of that year. Id.
50
Id. at 91.
51
Id. at 103.
52
Id. at 107–08 (―Judging the instruction given by the District Court in this case by
these principles, there is no doubt that its occasional references to the community
standards of the ‗nation as a whole‘ delineated a wider geographical area than would be
warranted by Miller . . . . Whether petitioners were materially prejudiced by those
references is a different question. Certainly the giving of such an instruction does not
render their conviction void as a matter of constitutional law.‖).
53
Id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54
See, e.g., United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 832 (11th Cir. 1982).
55
Id. at 829.
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which the material passes, and that the legislature intended this
flexibility in venue when it enacted the federal obscenity statutes.56
Similarly, in Sable v. FCC57 the Court upheld an amendment to
the Communications Act of 1934 imposing a ban on obscene ―diala-porn‖ telephone messages despite the fact that the ban would
potentially subject operators to varying community standards.58
The Court explained that while dial-a-porn operators could be held
to varying community standards depending on where in the
country the phone service was being accessed, this fact alone did
not render the statute unconstitutional. Rather, if the distributors
wanted to limit the community standards applicable to their
material, then the burden was on the distributors to implement a
screening system that selectively served those areas of the
country.59
The first major obscenity case involving the Internet was
decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1996.60 In United States v.
Thomas,61 the court affirmed the Tennessee conviction of a
husband and wife who operated an electronic bulletin board from
their home in California from which members could download
56

Id. at 830. The case involved 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (prohibiting the use of common
carriers to transport obscenity) and 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (prohibiting the use of interstate
commerce to transport obscenity), both of which are offenses within the provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 3237(a), which holds that any offense involving the use of the mails or the
transportation of goods in interstate commerce is a continuing offense that may be
prosecuted in every district in which the crime takes place, including the district in which
the materials were received. Id. at 830–31. Congressional intent in this manner is
supported by the 1958 revision of these statues to overrule a Tenth Circuit decision
holding that there was not a continuing offense in every district in which the material was
carried. Id. at 831 n.7.
57
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
58
492 U.S. at 123–26. ―Dial-a-porn‖ refers to sexually oriented pre-recorded
messages that callers pay to listen to. Id. at 117–18.
59
Id. at 125–26. The Court maintained this burden on distributors even after
acknowledging that such a screening system may be impractical or prohibitively
expensive. Id. at 125. The Court did, however, invalidate a portion of the law that would
have completely banned dial-a-porn messages that were indecent as applied to minors. Id.
at 130–31. The Court stated that the ban would have unconstitutionally limited lawful
adult-to-adult speech because of the chance that the speech would reach children. Id.
60
See Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle Over the First
Amendment: Can the Law Really Protect Children From Pornography on the Internet?,
21 J. MARSHALL J. COMP. & INFO. L. 141, 155 (2003).
61
74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
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pornographic content.62 The defendants and amicus curiae,
including the ACLU,63 argued that the use of such computer
technology required a definition of community ―based on the
broad-ranging connections among people in cyberspace rather than
the geographic locale of the federal judicial district of the criminal
trial.‖64 To hold otherwise, they argued, would ―chill‖ permitted
speech because anyone could access the material; the electontric
bulletin board operators had no means of geographically restricting
access to the online content.65 The court rejected the argument,
finding that the operators of the site, just like the dial-a-porn
operators, did have knowledge of and control over where the
material was being distributed because part of the membership
application for the bulletin board involved users submitting home
addresses and local phone numbers.66 In addition, the court found
that Sable supported the contention that it is the responsibility of
the distributor to tailor its distribution to the communities it
chooses to serve and that the distributor may have to incur the
costs necessary to develop a system to accomplish this objective.67
After Thomas, some commentators argued that the Internet was a
unique medium, requiring a national standard based on the nation‘s
community of Internet users.68
C. Congressional Regulation of the Internet and the Ashcroft Case
Congress joined in the obscenity debate in the 1990s and began
focusing on laws to make the Internet safer for children,69 like the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA)70 which ―prohibits
62

Id. at 705.
Id. at 711 n.8.
64
Id. at 711.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 711–12.
68
See, e.g., Gyong Ho Kim & Anna R. Paddon, Cybercommunity Versus Geographic
Community Standard For Online Pornography: A Technological Hierarchy in Judging
Cyberspace Obscenity, 26 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 65, 85 (1999) (arguing content
standards should be more permissive for the Internet than for other mediums such as
radio or television in part because of the lack of a ―captive audience‖ problem).
69
See Goldstein, supra note 60, at 158.
70
47 U.S.C. § 223 (1996), invalidated by Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857–58
(1997).
63
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the knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any
recipient under 18 years of age‖ and ―prohibits the knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner
that is available to a person under 18 years of age.‖71 Affirmative
defenses are available if the defendant takes ―good faith,
reasonable, effective and appropriate actions‖ to restrict access to
minors or requires proof of age.72 The CDA standard for
determining obscenity differed from the Miller test in two distinct
ways: it did not contain equivalents to either the prurient interest or
serious value prongs (prongs one and three of the Miller test
respectively).73
The Court invalidated the law.74 The Court found that the law
denied adults speech they have a constitutional right to
communicate, and was not the least restrictive means of achieving
the government‘s purpose.75 In addition, the law‘s potential
application was too wide in scope, making it vague and
troublesome under the Court‘s First Amendment analysis.76 The
Court speculated that a speaker would not know if he or she was
violating the law when discussing topics such as birth control and
prison rape, causing a chilling effect.77 In addition, the Court
clarified that ―the ‗community standards‘ criterion as applied to the
Internet means that any communication available to a nation wide
audience will be judged by the standards of the community most
likely to be offended by the message.‖78
71

Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) .
47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5).
73
Reno, 521 U.S. at 873.
74
Id. at 882. The Court allowed one part of the law to survive through its severability
clause, retaining the portion of the law pertaining to the ―knowing transmission‖ of
obscene—but not indecent—messages to minors. See id. at 882–83. O‘Connor, joined by
Rehnquist, concurred and dissented in part, and argued that the display portions of the
law should be struck down but not the ―knowing transmission‖ or ―knowing sending‖
portions of the law where the communicator knows all the recipients are minors and not a
combination of adults and minors. Id. at 891–93 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
75
Id. at 874. The government argued the statute‘s burden on speech could be cured
through the good faith defenses, although the Court doubted whether age verification
techniques were economically viable. Id. at 881–82.
76
Id. at 870.
77
Id. at 871–72.
78
Id. at 877–78.
72
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Congress‘ second attempt79 at regulating obscene material
aimed at children was the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).80
COPA prohibits the knowing communication to minors of
―material that is harmful to minors‖ for commercial purposes.81
This law incorporates a modification of the Miller test, making it
applicable to material harmful to minors.82 A group of website
operators, whose websites provided materials such as sexual health
and gay and lesbian resources intended for an adult audience,
brought a facial challenge to the statute.83 The website operators
were concerned that their materials might be considered harmful to
minors by some community standards.84 Thus, they argued that
―COPA violated adults‘ rights under the First and Fifth
Amendments because it (1) ‗create[d] an effective ban on
constitutionally protected speech by and to adults‘; (2) ‗[was] not
the least restrictive means of accomplishing any compelling
governmental purpose‘; and (3) ‗[was] substantially overbroad.‘‖85
The district court invalidated the law, finding in part that it was not
the least restrictive means of preventing minors from accessing
harmful material.86 The Third Circuit affirmed on related but
different grounds, holding that the use of community standards
rendered the statute substantially overbroad because web
publishers were not able to limit access based on the geographic
locale of particular Internet users, thus limiting the content

79

See Goldstein, supra note 60, at 166.
47 U.S.C. § 231 (1998).
81
Id. § 231(a)(1).
82
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569–70 (2002). The statute defines ―material that
is harmful to minors‖ as material that ―(A) the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to
minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest; (B)
depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast;
and (C) taken as a whole, lacks serious, literary, artistic, political or scientific value for
minors.‖ 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (emphasis added).
83
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 571.
84
Id. at 571.
85
Id. at 571–72 (alterations in original) (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 100–01,
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564 (No. 99-1324)).
86
Id. at 572.
80
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produced to that deemed acceptable by only the ―most puritan of
communities‖ in the nation.87
The Supreme Court considered the issue in Ashcroft v. ACLU,
and reversed and remanded the case to the Circuit court.88 Justice
Thomas, announcing the opinion of the Court, stated that a local
standard is not unconstitutional.89 The Court relied on Hamling v.
United States,90 in which the Court held that ―requiring a speaker
disseminating material to a national audience to observe various
community standards does not violate the First Amendment.‖91
The Court reiterated that it is acceptable to prohibit
communications considered obscene under some local standards
but not others.92 Justice Thomas added that the Third Circuit
distinguished these cases based on the speaker‘s ability to control
the distribution of the controversial material to certain geographic
communities.93 However, Thomas noted that in neither Hamling
nor Sable was the speaker‘s targeting ability integral to the legal
outcome.94 Instead, the Court emphasized that the Internet does
not call for a different standard, and ―[i]f a publisher wishes for its
material to be judged only by the standards of particular
communities, then it need only take the simple step of utilizing a
medium that enables it to target the release of its materials to those
communities.‖95
87

ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 2000). The court distinguished United
States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), finding it dissimilar to a modern Internet
case because the defendant in Thomas had the ability to geographically distinguish
among its bulletin board users. Id. at 176–77.
88
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 564–65. Justice Thomas announced the opinion of the court,
supported by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia. Justices O‘Connor and Breyer joined the
majority opinion in part and also wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice Kennedy
concurred, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsberg, and Justice Stevens dissented. Id. at
564.
89
Id. at 566.
90
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
91
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 580 (citing Hamling, 418 U.S. at 106).
92
Id. at 581.
93
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 581–82 (citing Sable Commc‘ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 125–26 (1989)).
94
Id. at 582.
95
Id. at 583. The justices considered that because of the law, content that otherwise
could be openly displayed would be put behind age verification screens, but did not find
any substantial overbreadth as a result. Id. at 584–85.
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Thomas indicated that he did not believe that the effect of local
community standards with regard to COPA would be any greater
than under other federal obscenity statues.96 According to
Thomas, the Court in Reno established the constitutionality of
these obscenity laws as applied to the Internet.97 In addition, under
Miller, community standards are not defined by reference to a
particular geographic area.98 Therefore, the Court held, a national
standard is not required and, even under a national standard a juror
will inevitably draw from his experiences in the community from
which he comes.99 Thomas also distinguished COPA from the
CDA, because the CDA‘s use of community standards on the
Internet was ―particularly problematic in light of the CDA‘s
breadth and vagueness,‖ covering material not limited by the three
prongs of the Miller test.100 In contrast, COPA followed Miller
and importantly excluded material with literary, artistic, political or
scientific value for minors.101
The Court made clear that the holding of the case was limited
to the narrow issue presented. ―[W]e hold only that COPA‘s
reliance on community standards to identify ‗material that is
harmful to minors‘ does not by itself render the statute substantially
overbroad . . . .‖ 102 The justices pointed out that the ruling did not
express a position as to whether the statute might be overbroad,
vague, or would survive strict scrutiny.103
O‘Connor joined the Thomas opinion in distinguishing COPA
from the CDA and finding COPA not substantially overbroad
because of community standards.104 She wrote separately to point
out that many of the materials at issue might already be exempt

96

Id. at 583–84. Specifically, the Court used the example of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)
(1994). Id. 581 n.11.
97
Id. at 584 (pointing out that in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877 n.44 (1997), that
transmitting obscenity or child pornography on the Internet was already illegal under
federal law for adults and juveniles).
98
Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 576 (citing Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974)).
99
Id. at 576–77.
100
Id. at 577–78.
101
Id. at 579.
102
Id. at 585.
103
Id. at 585–86.
104
Id. at 577–78, 585.
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from COPA‘s coverage because of their literary, artistic, political
or scientific value for minors.105 For instance, the sex education
materials would likely have scientific value in every jurisdiction.106
Although she was comfortable denying the facial challenge,
O‘Connor left open the possibility of future facial or as applied
challenges to the law.107 ―[G]iven Internet speakers‘ inability to
control the geographic location of their audience, expecting them
to bear the burden of controlling the recipients of their speech . . .
may be entirely too much to ask, and would potentially suppress an
inordinate amount of expression.‖108 O‘Connor further explained
that Miller does not prohibit a national standard; rather Miller held
a national standard was neither required nor unconstitutional.109
She continued that a national standard may have been
―unascertainable‖ to the Miller court, but developments like the
Internet have made jurors more aware of the views of adults in
other parts of the country.110 Therefore, according to O‘Connor,
―[a]doption of a national standard is necessary in my view for any
reasonable regulation of Internet obscenity.‖111
Breyer also joined the Thomas opinion in holding the
community standards element did not itself render COPA
substantially overbroad.112 Breyer wrote separately, arguing that
Congress intended the word community in the statute to refer to
the view of the nation‘s adult community as a whole concerning
what is appropriate material for minors.113 Breyer pointed out that
while the word community is not defined in the statute, the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend the word
to refer to separate standards among different communities.114
Breyer highlighted a House of Representatives report which
indicated that the committee members understood community
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Id. at 586 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 31 (1973)).
Id. at 588–89.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 585 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 589–90 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id.
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standards as an ―adult standard . . . reasonably constant among
adults in America‖ rather than a ―geographic standard.‖115 For
Breyer, the advantage of this position was the ability to avoid
examining otherwise serious First Amendment problems such as
providing ―the most puritan of communities with a heckler‘s
Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation.‖116
Kennedy concurred on the basis that the lower court‘s ruling
did not sufficiently assess the breadth of COPA‘s coverage and the
possible variations in community standards across the country,
making it impossible to determine if the law was really
overbroad.117 According to Kennedy, overbreadth depends on the
―extent of speech covered and the variations in community
standards with respect to that speech.‖118 However, Kennedy
explained, there was a lack of information before the Court
pertaining to whether, for instance, the variance of community
standards under this law would be any more severe than variations
of community standards under the federal obscenity statutes.119
Kennedy did identify objectionable elements of the law, finding
that ―the economics and technology of Internet communication
differ in important ways from those of telephones and mail.‖120
―[I]t is easy and cheap to reach a worldwide audience on the
Internet, but expensive if not impossible to reach a geographic
subset.‖121 Nonetheless, Kennedy found that this ―observation ‗by
itself‘‖ was insufficient to enjoin the act.122

115

Id. at 590 (emphasis omitted) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 28 (1998)).
Kennedy noted that Breyer‘s position on the legislative history is unsupported by the
record and relies on only one statement to infer the total view of Congress. Id. at 596
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Stevens agreed with Kennedy‘s position, finding that the clear
text of the statute indicated that jurors should consider community standards a ―term of
art that has taken on a particular meaning in light of our precedent,‖ relating back to
Miller which held that a national standard would be an ―exercise in futility.‖ Id. at 607
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116
Id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring).
117
Id. at 591 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118
Id. at 597.
119
Id. at 598.
120
Id. at 595.
121
Id. (citations omitted).
122
Id. at 597.
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Stevens dissented on the basis of COPA‘s overbreadth, arguing
that the statute covered ―arguably every depiction of nudity‖ which
is ―in some sense erotic with respect to minors.‖123 Stevens
pointed out that because ―erotic with respect to minors‖ is broader
than the Miller conception of obscenity, the sweep of the law is
expansive, and the danger of overbreadth is very real.124 Stevens
indicated that the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that
COPA would impact a large amount of protected speech that
would ―not be considered harmful to minors in many
communities.‖125 However, according to Stevens, Thomas‘s
solution of forcing the speaker to choose a different medium and a
more limited forum of expression would make the overbreadth
doctrine ―toothless.‖126 Stevens instead distinguished Ashcroft
from Hamling and Sable;127due to a ―fundamental difference in
technologies, the rules applicable to the mass mailing of an
obscene montage or to obscene dial-a-porn should not be used to
judge the legality of messages on the World Wide Web.‖128
Stevens clarified that he was primarily concerned with the
suppression of racy advertisements and online magazines that
could be considered harmful to minors in conservative
communities, not ―[t]he kind of hard-core pornography involved in
Hamling‖ which he believed ―does not belong on the Internet.‖129
On remand, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the preliminary
injunction against enforcement of COPA.130 The court determined
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits that COPA
was overbroad and would fail strict scrutiny.131 The Supreme
Court heard the case again in 2004, this time invalidating COPA
because it burdened adult access to protected speech and because

123

Id. at 608 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 608–09.
125
Id. at 611.
126
Id. at 606 n.2.
127
See id. at 605.
128
Id. at 606.
129
Id. at 611–12.
130
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 2003), aff’d and remanded, 542 U.S.
656 (2004).
131
Id. at 271.
124
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less restrictive alternatives were available.132 As a result the
Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court‘s grant of the preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for trial at the district court.133
On remand, the district court permanently enjoined the law for
being impermissibly vague, overbroad and for not being the least
restrictive means to achieve a compelling government interest.134
The Third Circuit affirmed135 and certiorari to the Supreme Court
was denied.136
D. Prosecutions of Adult Obscenity and the Application of the
Ashcroft Case
While the Supreme Court was interpreting laws pertaining to
obscenity directed at children on the Internet, lower courts began
to hear a new wave of prosecutions of obscenity directed at
adults.137 The Department of Justice under George W. Bush
launched several high-profile obscenity prosecutions around the
country against southern California-based pornography producers.
Some of the recent and most prominent cases are discussed
below.138

132
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 656–57, 666–67 (2004) (―Blocking and filtering
software is less restrictive alternative [to COPA]‖).
133
See id. at 658–59.
134
ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 186 (3d Cir. 2008).
135
Id. at 181.
136
Mukasey v. ACLU, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009).
137
See generally United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159 (11th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Adams, 337 F. App‘x 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the availability of
material from the Internet as acceptance of it by the local community for Miller test
purposes), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1161 (2010); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240
(9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting local standards in Internet obscenity cases); United States v.
Extreme Assocs., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578 (W.D. Pa. 2005) (ruling federal obscenity
laws unconstitutional), rev’d, 431 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding binding Supreme
Court precedent); United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting
motion to dismiss Internet obscenity prosecution); United States v. Harb, No. 2:07-CR426 TS, 2009 WL 499467, at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 27, 2009) (holding that the Miller
standard and not the Ashcroft standard applies to sales of obscenity over the Internet);
Rhett Pardon, Plea Deal Reached in Torture Portal Obscenity Case, XBIZ NEWSWIRE
(July 13, 2010), http://newswire.xbiz.com/view.php?id=122757 (reporting that a plea
deal was reached in NJ federal court for the operator of TorturePortal.com who sent
videos by mail to customers).
138
See Calvert, supra note 9, at 64–68.
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In 2003, federal prosecutors in Pittsburgh indicted two owners
of Extreme Associates, a California-based content distributor.139
Extreme Associates required that consumers seeking to access its
website become members, and asked for a username, password,
and credit card information, but the consumer‘s geographic
location was not required.140 A United States Postal Inspector141
registered an account and received content by mail and over the
Internet in the Western District of Pennsylvania.142 The content in
question included, among other things, the video Forced Entry,
which simulated a violent rape.143 The defendants pleaded guilty
in 2009 and each received one year and one day in prison.144 As
part of the plea agreement the defendants forfeited their domain
name. The company is now defunct.145
Defendants Sami and Michael Harb of the Ohio-based
company Movies by Mail were indicted in 2007146 and tried for

139

See Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 584, 586–88, 593 (dismissing the
indictment on the basis that federal obscenity statutes violated substantive due process
rights of liberty and privacy (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003))) rev’d, 431
F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding binding Supreme Court precedent). See also Paula Reed
Ward, Obscenity Case Begs Question: Whose Standard? Extreme Associates Trial May
be Catalyst for Change, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 25, 2009, at B1, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09025/944328-52.stm.
140
Extreme Associates, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82. The membership form referenced
by the district court included a Pittsburgh address along with the credit card information.
Id. at 583.
141
Id at 582. The Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement arm of the United
States Postal Service. See Mission, U.S. POSTAL INSPECTION SERV.,
https://postalinspectors.uspis.gov/aboutus/mission.aspx (last visited Sep. 4, 2011).
142
Id. at 584–85. The indictment was based on violations of 18 U.S.C.§§ 1461, 1462,
and 1465. Id.
143
Randy Dotinga, Legal Threats Stalk Adult Sites, WIRED (June 15, 2004),
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2004/06/63838.
144
Paula Reed Ward, Porn Producer, Wife Get 1-year Jail Terms: Acrimonious
Obscenity Case Took 7 Years, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 2, 2009, at A1, available
at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09183/981250-53.stm.
145
Grant Gross, Couple Gets Prison Time for Internet Obscenity: Extreme Associates
Owners are both Sentenced to a Year in Prison, IDG NEWS SERV. (July 3, 2009),
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/309771/couple_gets_prison_time_internet_
obscenity/.
146
Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Federal Grand Jury in Salt Lake City Charges
Cleveland Men with Obscenity Violations (June 28, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/June/07_crm_471.html.
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violations of federal obscenity laws in the District of Utah.147
Undercover agents ordered DVDs produced by Max Hardcore and
Extreme Associates from the Harbs‘ website and had the DVDs
mailed to a Utah address.148 The defendants each pleaded guilty to
one count of selling obscene material and were sentenced to a year
and a day in prison.149
Loren Jay Adams was charged with the transportation of
obscene materials in the federal district court in West Virginia.150
Adams, based in Martinsburg, Indiana, was convicted in 2008151
and received thirty-three months in jail.152 The content at issue
included bestiality and fisting videos.153 Officers ordered the
secondhand DVDs from Adams‘ website and received them via
postal mail.154 During the trial, Adams unsuccessfully attempted
to offer Internet-based evidence to show the local community
standards encompassed the work he had sold.155
147

United States v. Harb, No. 2:07-CR-426 TS, 2009 WL 499467, at *1 (D. Utah Feb.
27, 2009) (rejecting motion to dismiss and declining to transfer venue).
148
Press Release, supra note 146. The indictment indicated that the defendants had
sent 683 packages to addresses in Utah in 2006, 149 of them to Salt Lake City addresses.
Id.
149
Stephen Hunt, Ohio Men Sentenced for Mailing Porn Films to Utah, SALT LAKE
TRIBUNE (Nov. 19, 2009, 5:40 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=
13826641&itype=NGPSID&keyword=&qtype=.
150
United States v. Adams, 337 F. App‘x 336, 336, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming
the ruling of the district court).
151
Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Indiana Man Convicted of Obscenity
Violations by Federal Jury in West Virginia (Oct. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-crm-875.html.
152
Adams, 337 F. App‘x at 338, 340.
153
Id. at 338. The films included Doggie3Some, Anal Doggie and Horse, and Fisting 1.
Id.
154
Every Dog Has Its Day in Court: Bestiality, Fisting Videos Seized in FBI Obscenity
Bust, AVN INDUS. NEWS (July 2008), http://www.mydigitalpublication.com/publication/
index.php?i=4724&m=&l=&p=92&pre=&ver=swf.
155
Adams attempted to call a computer systems administrator to testify that by typing
in the words ―bestiality‖ and ―fisting‖ into Internet search engines, he found thousands of
results available in and around Martinsburg, West Virginia. Adams argued that the
presence of this material indicated acceptance of this type of content by the community,
thereby satisfying the local community standards. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court‘s rejection of this argument on the basis that ―availability/accessibility of
content . . . does not equal acceptance of that content.‖ Clay Calvert, Wendy Brunner,
Karla Kennedy & Kara Murrhee, Judicial Erosion of Protection for Defendants in
Obscenity Prosecutions?: When Courts Say, Literally, Enough is Enough and When
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Occasionally, prosecutors have brought suits in multiple
districts in order to secure indictments. For example, in 2010,
prosecutors in New Jersey reached a plea deal with Floridabased156 operator of tortureportal.com, Barry Goldman, following
an indictment for obscenity charges in federal court in New
Jersey.157 A previous indictment against Goldman was dropped in
Montana.158 Goldman‘s videos, which included Torture of a Porn
Store Girl, were distributed via the postal mail from Goldman‘s
website.159 Goldman received three years probation.160
One of the key issues that has arisen in the legal challenges
arising from these prosecutions concerns whether a national
standard is necessary for Internet-based obscenity prosecutions,
and whether such a standard is mandated by the Ashcroft case.161
These particular questions were addressed in obscenity cases in
2009 and 2010 by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, and the District
Court for the District of Columbia.162
The Ninth Circuit addressed the community standards issue in
a case arising from an e-mail spamming operation.163 Jeffrey
Internet Availability Does Not Mean Acceptance, 1 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 7, 32
(2010). Other defense attorneys have attempted to make similar arguments in other
obscenity cases. For example, in a Pensacola, Florida case that settled out of court, a
defense lawyer planned to use Google Trends to show ―orgy‖ was searched for more
frequently than ―apple pie.‖ Id. at 31. If the correct technology is used with local data
including numbers of Internet users, defense attorneys argue, this should demonstrate
community acceptance of Internet content. See id. at 32–33. See generally Shannon
Creasy, Defending Against a Charge of Obscenity in the Internet Age: How Google
Searches Can Illuminate Miller‘s “Contemporary Community Standards,” 26 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1029 (2010).
156
Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, Federal Grand Jury Charges Florida Man with
Obscenity Violations (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/
September/08-crm-822.html.
157
Rhett Pardon, Plea Deal Reached in Torture Portal Obscenity Case, XBIZ
NEWSWIRE (July 13, 2010, 2:30 PM), http://newswire.xbiz.com/view.php?id=122757.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Rhett Pardon, 3 Years Probation for Torture Porn Operator, XBIZ NEWSWIRE,
(Mar. 11, 2011, 10:15 AM) http://newswire.xbiz.com/view.php?id=131568.
161
Matthew Dawson, Comment, The Intractable Obscenity Problem 2.0: The Emerging
Circuit Split Over the Constitutionality of “Local Community Standards” Online, 60
CATH. U.L. REV. 719, 724 (2011).
162
Id. at 725.
163
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Kilbride and James Schaffer were charged in federal district court
in Arizona164 with fraud, conspiracy to commit money laundering,
and interstate transportation of obscene materials.165
The
obscenity charges arose from two sexually explicit images that
appeared within the defendants‘ e-mails.166 The government
introduced the testimony of witnesses who had complained to the
FTC about the defendant‘s emails, including their reactions to the
pornographic images, as well as the text of complaints made to the
FTC.167 The defendants were convicted and each received a prison
term of over five years.168
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal.169
The defendants challenged the trial judge‘s jury instruction, which
instructed the jury to determine obscenity using ―contemporary
community standards‖ but did not provide the precise geographic
area of the ―community.‖170 The appellate court considered the
defendants‘ argument that the jury instruction was incorrect in the
context of e-mail, a medium they argued requires a national
standard.171 The argument was that distribution via e-mail
unavoidably subjects the work to the least tolerant community in
the country, burdening First Amendment protected speech.172 The
argument further contends that this speech is distinguishable from
Hamling and Sable because there is no means to control where
geographically the message will be received.173

164

Id.
Id. at 1244.
166
Id. The obscenity charges in the Kilbride prosecution were not primarily a result of
the Justice Department targeting obscenity as with the other cases discussed in this
section. Rather, the obscenity charges arose in the context of criminal charges stemming
from e-mail spamming crimes. Id.
167
Id. at 1245.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 1244.
170
Id. at 1247 (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974)).
171
Id. The defendants alternatively argued that the jury instruction was invalid because
it allowed the jury to consider standards other than those from their local community, but
this was rejected as Hamling specifically allowed the use of a community standard
without reference to a precise geographic definition. Id. at 1247–48.
172
Id. at 1250.
173
Id. at 1251.
165
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Writing for the court, Judge Betty Fletcher identified that in
Reno v. ACLU, ―one of among several issues of facial overbreadth
in the CDA‖ concerned the use of community standards as applied
to the Internet, but that the Reno decision did not conclude that the
use of local community standards by itself would render a statute
facially overbroad.174 Ultimately, Judge Fletcher decided that
Ashcroft v. ACLU was more applicable to the defendant‘s
argument.175 Judge Fletcher noted that the ―divergent reasoning‖
of the justices in Ashcroft failed to provide an ―explicit holding,‖
but she was ―able to derive guidance from the areas of agreement
in the various opinions‖ by viewing the holding as the position
taken by the members concurring on the narrowest grounds.176
According to Judge Fletcher, Justice Thomas‘ opinion held that
either the application of a local or national community standard
would pose no constitutional concern by itself.177 ―Justice
O‘Connor and Justice Breyer held more narrowly that while
application of a national community standard would not or may not
create constitutional concern, application of local community
standards likely would.‖178 Thus, according to Judge Fletcher,
these two justices agreed with a limited aspect of Justice Thomas‘
holding, ―that the variance inherent in application of a national
community standard would likely not pose constitutional concerns
by itself,‖ without holding local community standards ―similarly
unproblematic.‖179 In this narrower holding addressing the lack of
constitutional concern of a national community standard, according
to Fletcher, O‘Connor and Breyer were joined by justices
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Stevens. Ultimately, Judge
Fletcher determined that these six justices, five of whom concurred
in the judgment, ―viewed the application of local community
standards in defining obscenity on the Internet as generating
serious constitutional concerns.‖180
174

Id. at 1251–52.
Id. at 1252.
176
Id. at 1253–54 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977)).
177
Id. at 1254.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. Judge Fletcher recognized that Kennedy and Stevens identified problems with
the national standard, including that a national standard will not produce actual
175
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Judge Fletcher went on to state that, as applied to obscenity
statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465, the application of local
standards ―generate[s] grave constitutional doubts as to the use of
such standards.‖181 Therefore, according to Judge Fletcher, the
district court should have applied a national standard.182 Despite
this finding, Judge Fletcher did not reverse the conviction, finding
no plain error.183 Instead, Judge Fletcher found the law in this area
is highly unsettled and held that the jury instruction did not amount
to reversible error.184
Similar issues arose in the Little case.185 In 2008, Paul Little
and Max World Entertainment, Inc. were convicted of distribution
of obscene materials.186 California-based Little, who went by the
name Max Hardcore, was responsible for videos in which female
actors drank urine, vomited, and used medical and dental devices
in sex acts.187 Department of Justice agents captured and copied
five trailers found on the company‘s website, which were
representative of the videos the website was offering for sale.188 In
addition, Postal Inspectors used a Tampa shipping address to order
five DVDs from the company‘s website, which were sent via
postal mail.189 The defendants were convicted on all ten counts of
violation of federal obscenity statutes.190 Little was sentenced to a

uniformity as applications will vary based on juror‘s own local understanding. She noted
that the Kilbride holding does not preclude a future challenge to national standards. Id. at
1254 n.8.
181
Id. at 1254.
182
Id. at 1250.
183
Id. at 1255. The conviction was affirmed with a remand for a clerical correction for
misdemeanor charges that were miswritten as felonies. Id. at 1245–46.
184
Id. at 1255.
185
United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 162–64 (11th Cir. 2010).
186
Id. at 160 (affirming the ruling of the district court).
187
Ben Montgomery, To the Jury, obscene; to him, a day’s work, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (June 8, 2008), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/article611988.
ece.
188
Little, 365 F. App‘x at 161.
189
Id. The trailers formed the basis for the five counts under 18 U.S.C. § 1465,
transportation of obscenity via interstate commerce or interactive computer service
affecting such commerce. Id. No information was required from the website user before
in order to access the trailers. See id. The DVDs formed the basis of the five counts under
18 U.S.C. § 1461, distribution of obscenity via postal mail. Id.
190
Id.
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forty-six month prison term and fines.191
forfeited.192
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Little‘s website was

In the appeal following the conviction, the appellants
challenged the use of local standards in an Internet-based obscenity
case.193 They argued that the district court should have applied a
national or Internet community standard as opposed to the local
community standard of the Middle District of Florida.194 They
contended that the use of local standards infringed on their First
Amendment rights because the Internet publisher can be judged
according to the strictest community standards in the nation, even
if no specific speech was targeted at those communities.195
Appellants distinguished themselves from the appellant in Miller
because they ―did not direct their Internet publication at any one
area.‖196 The appellants relied heavily on Ashcroft and Kilbride.197
The foundation of the appellants‘ argument was the proposition
that the ―transmission of materials over the Internet is inherently
different than traditional, concrete, real world conveyance of
materials.‖198
Unconvinced, the court affirmed the conviction, declining ―to
follow the reasoning of Kilbride.‖199 The court found that the
portions of Ashcroft dictating a national community standard were
―dicta, not the ruling of the court.‖200 The court cited Justice
O‘Connor‘s concurring opinion in Ashcroft—―I write separately to
express my views on the constitutionality and desirability of

191
Id. Little received a $7,500 fine and a $1,000 special assessment. Max World
Entertainment, Inc. received thirty-three months probation and a $75,000 fine. Id.
192
Mark Kernes, Judge Finds Max Hardcore Guilty on All Counts in Obscenity Trial,
AVN INDUS. NEWS (June 6, 2008, 8:58 AM), http://www.defendourporn.org/?p=29.
193
Little, 365 F. App‘x at 163–64.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 163.
196
Id. The court pointed out that Miller was meant to protect geographically distinct
parts of the country from each other‘s tastes, but ―Miller could not envision the
amorphous and viral nature of the Internet.‖ Id. at 163 n.9.
197
Id. at 164.
198
Id. at 163.
199
Id. at 164.
200
Id.
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adopting a national standard‖201—as well as Justice Kennedy‘s
concurring opinion—―[W]e need not decide whether the statute
invokes local or national community standards to conclude that
vacatur and remand are in order.‖202 Therefore, the appellate court
held that the district court did not err in using the ―average person
of the community as a whole‖ standard of the Middle District of
Florida.203
Similar issues arose in a case originating in the District of
Columbia.204 John Stagliano and his California-based production
company, Evil Angel Productions, were indicted in 2008205 in
Washington, D.C., for distribution of obscene materials.206 FBI
agents downloaded a free trailer on the website and placed an order
for two DVDs by mail by mailing a form printed from the
defendant‘s website.207 In the course of the case, the district court
for the District of Columbia considered a motion to dismiss the
indictment for trafficking in obscenity because the community
standards requirement rendered the statute overbroad.208 The
defendants argued that ―the ‗community standards‘ test,
[suppresses] more speech than is constitutionally permissible when
201

Id. at 164 n.10 (citing Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) (O‘Connor, J.,
concurring) (emphasis omitted).
202
Id. (citing Ashcroft 535 U.S. at 586 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
203
Id. at 164.
204
United States v. Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d 25, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying motion
to dismiss).
205
Richard Abowitz, Vegas Producer Stagliano Charged with Obscenity, LA TIMES
BLOG (Apr. 9, 2008, 10:34 AM), http://vegasblog.latimes.com/vegas/2008/04/formervegas-pr.html. In regard to the mailed DVDs, the defendants were charged with
knowingly transporting obscene materials in interstate commerce in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1465 and knowingly using an express company or common carrier to ship the
films in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 28. In regard to the
website trailer, the defendants were charged with knowingly using an interstate computer
service to distribute obscene material in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1465 and knowingly using an interstate computer service to display an obscene image in
a manner available to a person under eighteen in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 223(d). Id. In
addition, they were charged with intent to distribute obscene material in interstate
commerce while engaged in the business of selling obscene material in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1466. Id.
206
Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 27.
207
Id. at 28–29. The trailer was entitled Fetish Fantasies Chapter 5. The DVDs were
entitled Milk Nymphos and Storm Squirters 2: Target Practice Id.
208
Id. at 27–29.
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applied to the Internet. Because Internet publishers, unlike those
who use mail or telephone, cannot limit the geographic reach of the
materials they post on the Internet.‖209
The district court determined that while Ashcroft voiced
concerns over the community standards requirements, ―those
concerns hardly suffice to render the more narrow obscenity
statutes unconstitutional as applied to the Internet.‖210 The court
continued that if ―incorporation of community standards did not by
itself render [COPA] substantially overbroad,‖ then it certainly
could not be true for the obscenity statutes, which are more limited
in scope.211 Judge Leon expressed the argument as follows:
[T]o the extent that the obscenity statutes are
overbroad at all . . . it stands to reason that the
potential scope of that overbreadth is less extensive
than the overbreadth resulting from COPA. After
all, COPA threatened greater overbreath because it
regulated far more than obscenity—it regulated
―material that is harmful to minors.‖212
Obscenity statutes, which exempt material with literary,
artistic, political or scientific value and contain the requirement
that the material appeal to the ―prurient interest‖ or be ―patently
offensive,‖ are more limited than COPA.213 Therefore, Judge Leon
could not invalidate the obscenity statutes when the Supreme Court
was unwilling to invalidate COPA in the absence of substantial
overbreadth.214 In addition, because the value of obscene speech is
so low, any burden imposed upon it by an overbroad statute would
be minimal, further weakening the argument for the invalidation of
obscenity statutes.215

209

Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
211
Id. at 32.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 33.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 33 n.9. The defendants also argued the overbreath of the obscenity statutes
was aggravated on the Internet by the requirement that the obscene material be evaluated
as a whole, raising the difficulty of assessing pictures and images in the context of the
websites on which they are found. Id. at 33–34. The court was satisfied that limiting
210
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Judge Leon also disagreed with the Kilbride court‘s reading of
Ashcroft.216 Judge Leon did not find that five justices supported
the application of a national standard.217 Rather, Judge Leon began
with the premise that ―[e]ight justices concurred in the judgment
that the use of community standards did not ‗by itself render the
statute substantially overbroad.‘‖218 Among the eight, Leon
continued, Thomas, Rehnquist and Scalia upheld the local standard
―based on their belief that COPA was sufficiently narrow in its
application.‖219 Four justices—O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg—were willing to approve variations in community
standards ―based on the amount of speech covered and the degree
of variance among communities.‖220 However, Judge Leon did not
find a fifth justice to support this position because Justice Breyer
determined that a national standard should apply. 221 Unlike the
other justices, in Judge Leon‘s interpretation, Breyer did not
concur with Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion not because the plaintiffs
failed to offer proof, but because he believed, based on
congressional intent, that the statute called for a national
standard.222 Unlike his colleagues, Justice Breyer did not find that
local community standards might be constitutional.223 Thus
Breyer‘s reasoning differed from the other justices and Judge Leon
did not find it controlling and the defendants‘ motions to dismiss
were rejected.224
The differences between the Ninth Circuit in Kilbride, the
Eleventh Circuit in Little, and the District Court for the District of
Columbia in Stagliano have led some scholars to call for Supreme
instructions could be used to avoid this problem and ensure that works are judged as a
whole on the Internet. Id. at 34.
216
Id. at 33 n.8.
217
See id.
218
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2003)).
219
Stagliano, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 32 n.8.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
Id. All charges were dropped in 2010 due to serious inconsistencies in the
government testimony. See Richard Abowitz, The Stagliano Victory Party: Field Notes
from the Justice Department’s Obscene Case against the Adult Film Industry, REASON
(July 19, 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/07/19/the-stagliano-victory-party.

HERTZ-BUNZL (DO NOT DELETE)

174

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

12/12/2011 2:00 PM

[Vol. 22:145

Court resolution.225 Clay Calvert, for example, welcomed the
Kilbride court‘s implication that a national standard would be more
permissive of sexual expression than that of the least tolerant
community in the nation.226 However, Calvert pointed out, a
national standard could also be difficult for jurors to apply because
they may not have an awareness of what comprises the national
standard.227
Calvert found that the division between the Eleventh and Ninth
Circuits, and ensuing disagreement among prominent scholars
could provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to ―revisit the
Miller test generally.‖228 In the meantime, federal prosecutors will
likely continue their aggressive prosecution campaign in
conservative jurisdictions, but stay away from bringing cases in the
Ninth Circuit.229
Similarly, Sarah Kagan welcomed the Kilbride decision,
arguing that ―the application of local community standards to the
Internet, an amorphous, virtual community that transcends lines
drawn on maps, is inappropriate.‖230 The use of the local standard
fails to provide notice, allows for forum shopping, and chills
speech.231
In contrast, another scholar, Orin Kerr disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit‘s interpretation of Ashcroft.232
According to Kerr:
―[C]oncerns are not positions. You can‘t count the number of
Justices who had a particular thought and then say that the thought
is somehow binding on the lower courts.‖233 In addition, Kerr
pointed out that Miller still directly controls despite the Ashcroft

225

Calvert, supra note 9, at 80–84.
Id. at 80.
227
Id. at 85.
228
Id. at 84–85.
229
Id. at 85.
230
Sarah Kagan, Note, Obscenity on the Internet: Nationalizing the Standard to Protect
Individual Rights, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 233, 257 (2010).
231
Id. at 251.
232
Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Adopts National Standard for Internet Obscenity, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY BLOG (Oct. 29, 2009), http://volokh.com/2009/10/29/ninth-circuit-adoptsnational-standard-for-internet-obscenity/.
233
Id.
226
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ruling, and that Miller must be followed by the lower courts until
the Supreme Court indicates otherwise.234
II. CRITICISM AND PRAISE FOR COMMUNITY STANDARDS
The courts represent one subset of the legal community divided
over the application of obscenity law in the Internet context.
Scholars are also divided about what standards should be applied
in online obscenity cases. A subset of these scholars has defended
the use of a local standard in obscenity prosecutions.235 Others
have argued that the local standard is untenable.236 In the wake of
Lawrence v. Texas237 some scholars have questioned whether
obscenity law should exist at all.238 This section identifies three
sets of policy arguments. The first set is critical of obscenity law,
the community standards approach, and local standards. The
second set supports prosecutions of obscenity under the
community standards approach, including the use of local
standards. The third set of arguments develops the theory that a
rule requiring either local or national standards will not make a
meaningful difference and the only way to achieve change in
234

Id.
See Timothy S.T. Bass, Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some Reasons for Retaining the
Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 471, 472 (1996); Fee, supra note 19,
at 1692.
236
See Dr. Yuval Karniel & Haim Wismonsky, Pornography, Community and the
Internet—Freedom of Speech and Obscenity on the Internet, 30 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH.
L.J. 105, 129 (2004); Kim & Paddon, supra note 68, at 66. Both articles argue for a
national standard based on the nation‘s community of Internet users.
237
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating conviction interfering with the sexual privacy of
consenting adults).
238
See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV.
1635, 1678–79 (2005) (noting that moral harm should not be the basis of censorship of
obscenity and modern obscenity prosecutions tend to be arbitrary in nature); Arnold H.
Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated Concept for the Twenty-First Century, 10 NEXUS 21, 26–
27 (2005) (finding that modern technology has limited the harms obscenity has posed to
society and Lawrence held morality cannot justify legislation); see also Elizabeth M.
Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379, 1425 (2008) (noting
that obscenity doctrine has produced a discriminatory effect against gays and lesbians).
Jeffrey Rosen has argued that with the rise of hard-core pornography as a large industry,
it has become impossible to develop social consensus about what constitutes obscenity in
any community. See Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Obscenity, 6 NEW ATLANTIS 75, 80
(2004), available at http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-end-of-obscenity.
235
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obscenity law is to change the community standards approach
altogether.
A. Obscenity’s Troubling Elements
Arguments against the community standards test and the use of
a local standard, emphasize due process, vagueness, and
overbreadth concerns. The due process problem occurs when
individuals in certain communities want to purchase content and
producers and distributors are willing to sell it to them. Under the
community standards approach, producers and distributors may be
subject to criminal penalties solely because of where the buyer
lives, even if the buyer himself voluntarily and knowingly
purchased the material.239 In this fact pattern, the state (or more
specifically the local community), is making moral choices for an
individual. The Supreme Court, in cases like Lawrence, has
disapproved of this type of state-influenced moral decisionmaking.240 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit rejected a due process
challenge to the obscenity statutes on exactly this basis in the
Extreme Associates case.241
The due process criticism of
community standards is not unique to the Internet in particular, and
would be valid for any medium through which obscenity is
distributed.242
In addition, there is a vagueness problem associated with the
community standards test. Producers might not know how to
comply with obscenity law—how to create pornography without
239

See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(―National distributors choosing to send their products in interstate travels will be forced
to cope with the community standards of every hamlet into which their goods may
wander.‖).
240
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 585 (holding that ―a law branding one class of
persons as criminal based solely on the State‘s moral disapproval of that class and the
conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the
Equal Protection Clause under any standard of review.‖).
241
See United States v. Extreme Assocs., 431 F.3d 150, 151–54 (3d Cir. 2005)
(rejecting the principle that after Lawrence ―the government can no longer rely on the
advancement of a moral code‖ as a compelling state interest inconsistent with Supreme
Court holdings on obscenity).
242
See Hamling, 418 U.S. at 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brennan‘s Hamling
dissent concerned obscenity distributed via the postal mail, but raised concerns about
punishing the producer simply because of where his products could possibly travel).
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facing criminal prosecution.243 Trends in what is prosecuted have
altered over time. For instance, the current focus of the Justice
Department is on extreme sexual acts, but in the 1980s many
prosecutions were focused on more traditional pornography.244 By
the early 1980s, most state prosecutors had ceased prosecuting ―the
most common types of hard-core pornography.‖245 When the
targets of what is obscene change over time, there is no way to
know what to produce and what not to produce. This is again not a
new problem unique to the Internet era, but rather has been a
longstanding criticism of Miller.246
The third criticism of the community standards approach is the
issue of overbreadth and the potential chilling effect on protected
speech. There is no clear method by which distributors can
anticipate which communities to avoid.247 Like the vagueness and
due process critiques, the overbreadth problem is not necessarily
unique to the Internet but it may be exacerbated by it. The Internet
has made much more content available and freely accessible. The
Internet allows for the widespread dispersal of information to all
communities in the United States, without regard for location. If
producers must cater to the limitations imposed by the most
conservative communities that will limit speech and likely render
obscenity laws overbroad in the context of the Internet.
B. Defending the Prosecution of Internet Obscenity
There are also arguments in support of the community
standards approach and the use of local standards in the Internet
243
Justice Douglas dissented in Miller and argued that an administrative censor
reviewing work prior to publication would be better than the community standards
approach; at least then ―the publisher would know when he was on dangerous ground‖
and could decide to defy the censor or not. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 41 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). The Miller approach creates ―ex post facto law.‖ Id.
244
For instance, the material at issue in Bagnell consisted of ―oral, anal, and genital
copulation‖ among heterosexual and homosexual actors. United States v. Bagnell, 679
F.2d 826, 837 (11th Cir. 1982). Hamling involved group intercourse, oral sex, and
masturbatory acts. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 92–93 (1974).
245
Fee, supra note 19, at 1695–96.
246
See Miller, 413 U.S. at 41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Douglas‘ dissent in Miller
concerned obscenity distributed via the postal mail, but addressed concerns about not
knowing what material produced could be considered obscene).
247
Fee, supra note 19, at 1715.
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context.248 Local standards may be considered necessary to protect
conservative communities from the most intense pornography on
the Internet, including bestiality,249 pissing and vomiting
scenarios,250 and simulated rape.251 To the extent Miller and the
community standards approach provide a justification for
prosecuting this material, there is an increased rationale to do so as
the Internet allows this extreme material to reach intolerant
communities quickly and easily.252
Keeping obscenity removed from easily accessible parts of the
Internet helps achieve a goal of Miller—namely, allowing
communities to decide what content to make available. In Paris
Adult Theatre, the Court expressed concerns over ―decency,‖
―quality of life,‖ and the ―tone of commerce‖ when discussing the
regulation of adult movie theatres.253 Some consider obscenity to
have so little value and contribute so little to society, that banning
it preserves the ―social interest in order and morality.‖254 Using
local community standards on the Internet, and doing so by
holding the entire country to the standard of its most conservative
communities, may in fact safeguard the communities most
threatened by extreme material.
Critics of community standards and of the local standard in
particular often label prosecutorial practices in regard to obscenity
on the Internet ―forum shopping.‖255 These prosecutions, however,
may be considered positive, as they respect ―the autonomy of those
communities where obscenity is unlikely to be tolerated.‖256 The
result of these prosecutions may ultimately limit the production of
certain kinds of extreme content altogether or force pornography

248

See generally Bass, supra note 236.
See United States v. Adams, 337 F. App‘x 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2009).
250
See Montgomery, supra note 188.
251
See Dotinga, supra note 143.
252
See id. (―Extreme material is especially popular on the internet.‖).
253
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57–58 (1973).
254
Fee, supra note 19, at 1719 (citing Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass‘n, 127 S. Ct.
2372, 2381 (2007)).
255
Dotinga, supra note 143 (―[F]ederal prosecutors decided to pursue the case in
Pittsburgh because they think it‘s more likely to cough up conservative jurors.‖).
256
Fee, supra note 19, at 1716–17.
249
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producers to be selective, to the extent possible with the Internet,
in where they distribute content.
This kind of a chilling effect on production is not a new
development in the pornography industry. For instance, the cable
pay-per-view pornography industry tailors content to hotels in
different areas of the country.257 Producers may also simply
decide not to ship content to certain areas of the country.258 For
example, most adult companies will not ship content to Utah.259 It
is true, however, that the Internet is different than cable television.
In its current technological form content cannot be directed to
particular localities and not others.260 But despite this general
limitation, Internet distributors may be able to create limited
content barriers based on geography through the development of
more accurate limiting technology, including firewalls, to
geographically restrict user access.261 This process would allow
producers of obscene material to control the areas into which they
distribute and thereby ensure its legality.
C. Questioning Distinctions Between Local and National
Standards
The third set of arguments focuses on whether a national or a
local standard would make a meaningful difference in obscenity
prosecutions. Some have argued that there is no meaningful
distinction between the local and national standards in reducing
obscenity laws‘ chilling effect on free speech, because speakers on
national networks ―will still be unable to predict how every jury in
every community will view the ‗national‘ decency standard.‖262 In
257

Calvert, supra note 9, at 71–72.
Id. at 70.
259
Id.
260
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569–70 (2002).
261
Frequently Asked Questions, HULU.COM, http://www.hulu.com/about/media_faq
(last visited Apr. 9, 2011); Frequently Asked Questions, NETFLIX.COM
https://www.netflix.com/Help?faqtrkid=4&p_search_text=abroad&srch=Search
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2011) (―Q: Can I watch instantly outside the United States? A: We
currently have the rights to distribute streaming content within the United States and
Canada. This means you may only watch instantly on your compatible computer or
Netflix-ready device within the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia and Canada.‖).
262
See Sergent, supra note 20, at 716 (arguing that obscenity should receive the same
First Amendment protections as ordinary speech).
258
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Ashcroft, Justice Thomas pointed out that even if a national
standard existed, jurors would still reach inconsistent
conclusions.263 Justice O‘Connor similarly expressed the concern
that even with a national standard, jurors would still ―inevitably
base their assessments to some extent on the experience of their
local communities.‖264 Thus, even with a national standard,
prosecutors would still be able to forum shop and bring cases in
those jurisdictions with less tolerant communities.
While the standard currently in place is termed the local
standard, in actuality the standard used by courts varies from case
to case. However, the variety in the kinds of standards used has
not resulted in different outcomes. To demonstrate this point,
consider the various standards and instructions used by courts
across the nation. In Bagnell, the jury was instructed to consider
the standards of the ―southern district of Florida, particularly Dade
County.‖265 In Little, the district court instructed the jury to
consider the standards of the Middle District of Florida.266 In
Thomas, the court applied the standards of the Western District of
Tennessee.267 In Miller, the jury was instructed to evaluate the
materials by the standards of the state of California.268 In other
cases the community has not been geographically defined at all. In
Kilbride, for example, the jury was instructed that the community
was not to be defined by any particular geographic area and that
they could consider evidence from outside the particular district of
the trial.269 In Hamling, the jury was expressly instructed to
consider a national standard—―the standard throughout this

263

Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 567–77 (2002).
Id. at 589 (O‘Connor, J., concurring).
265
United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 835 (11th Cir. 1982). The use of Dade
County was acceptable despite it being a smaller area than the judicial district because
Miller envisioned no precise geographic area when determining community standards. Id.
at 835–36. The point was only to allow the juror to draw on the community from which
he comes to assess the conclusion that the average person, applying community
standards, would reach in a particular case. Id.
266
United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 163–64 (11th Cir. 2010).
267
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996).
268
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973).
269
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 2009).
264
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country concerning sex and matters pertaining to sex.‖270 Each of
these cases involved a similar fact pattern and each resulted in
either guilty pleas or a conviction.271 Given the consistency in
results among the variety of standards currently in place, it is
unclear why or how the results might differ if juries were always
instructed to use a national standard.
On the other hand, it is also possible that a national standard
could change outcomes, especially over time. If jurors are
consistently introduced to one set of clearly defined community
practices and standards, it is conceivable that this would lead to
increased consistency across the nation in what is considered
obscene and what is not.272 If the practices of the national
community being considered included residents of large urban
centers as well as smaller rural towns—and everywhere in
between, thereby forming a representative sample of the nation‘s
various viewpoints—one would expect consistency across
jurisdictions.
A switch to a national standard would also likely enhance the
ability of defense lawyers to raise comprehensive defenses to
obscenity charges. Defense attorneys could introduce evidence
that the materials are present in the community and demonstrate
that the charged material does not in fact violate the community‘s
standards of obscenity. For example, in one non-Internet-based
obscenity case from Utah, a defense lawyer introduced into
evidence data on local residents‘ use of cable and satellite pay-perview television pornography in local hotels, resulting in a not
guilty verdict.273 Under local standards, it is difficult for defense
lawyers to show that the residents of a particular geographic
270

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 103 (1974). The Miller Court disapproved
of this jury instruction but did not find it rendered the conviction void. Miller, 413 U.S. at
31.
271
See supra Part I (discussing each of these cases in detail).
272
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 589 (2002) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―the
existence of the Internet, and its facilitation of national dialogue, has itself made jurors
more aware of the views of adults in other parts of the United States.‖).
273
See Timothy Egan, EROTICA INC.—A Special Report.; Technology Sent Wall
Street Into Market for Pornography, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/us/erotica-special-report-technology-sent-wallstreet-into-market-for-pornography.html?src=pm.
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community use the Internet in a certain way, just as it is difficult
for Internet producers to limit the distribution of their content to
any particular geographic part of the country.274 A national
standard would likely open the door to more evidence from around
the nation, including the nationwide popularity of pornographic
websites. Strengthening this defense may alleviate concerns
defendants face about being tried anywhere in the country for
obscenity. It is therefore critical to determine whether the adoption
of a national standard would significantly change the community
standards approach to resolve disputes over the application of
obscenity law to the Internet.
III. OBSCENITY LAW LACKS A SIMPLE PATH FORWARD
Obscenity law is currently in a state of uncertainty. The
Ashcroft decision does not mandate the use of a national standard
in adult obscenity cases.275 The Kilbride court misinterpreted the
divergent opinions in Ashcroft.276 The Ashcroft justices were clear
that the holding was limited to obscene material aimed at children,
and did not extend to obscenity aimed at adults.277 From a policy
standpoint, the choice between a national and a local standard may
not have a large impact on obscenity prosecutions, as prosecutors
would still be able to bring charges against obscenity in districts
across the nation even under a national standard.278 Nonetheless,
critics of obscenity law make a strong case that the local
community standards approach violates due process, and is vague
and overbroad, especially when applied to the Internet.279
Ultimately, the only chance for real reform in this area requires
reevaluating the entire community standards approach to
obscenity, and either specifically defining obscene content or

274

See Ascroft, 535 U.S. at 595 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that identifying
Internet usage by locality is more difficult than identifying local cable and satellite payper-view television usage which can be easily tracked to certain hotels or residential
communities).
275
See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 564.
276
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F. 3d 1240, 1252–54 (9th Cir. 2009).
277
See Ashcroft, 353 U.S. at 570, 578–79.
278
See Sergent, supra note 20, at 674–76.
279
See Calvert, supra note 9, at 85.
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repealing obscenity laws altogether.280 Alternatively, there may
also be technological solutions by which Internet content could be
more purposefully directed at geographic areas within the United
States.281 Even without a technological solution, access to Internet
sources can be limited in parts of the country through digital access
applications and the distributions of some content through nonInternet mediums.282 It is clear that more fundamental change is
needed in this area of the law.
A. Ashcroft’s Limited Holding
In the wake of the Ashcroft decision, the Kilbride court held
that a national standard was necessary in adult Internet obscenity
cases.283 However, Ashcroft does not require a national standard in
adult Internet obscenity cases and the Kilbride case was wrongly
decided. The Kilbride method of understanding the position of
five justices in Ashcroft is flawed. Fundamentally, the overbreadth
concerns set forth in Ashcroft concerning COPA do not apply to
adult obscenity statutes, as COPA concerned a much larger scope
of material. The justices in Ashcroft made clear that they were
addressing the standard for material directed at minors under
COPA, and did not extend the holding to standards for adult
obscenity under federal obscenity statutes.
In the Kilbride case, Judge Fletcher looked for agreement
among five concurring justices on the narrowest possible
grounds.284 In her interpretation, the Thomas group held that there
was no requirement to use either a local or a national standard.285
In addition, according to Fletcher, the O‘Connor, Kennedy, Breyer
and Stevens opinions each found significant problems with the use

280

For example, in Canada the courts have moved away from a community standards
approach and have turned towards a definition of obscenity based on harm or significant
risk of harm posed by the content, including harm to the functioning of society, the
creation of anti-social behavior and the degradation of women. See Boyce, supra note 8,
at 335–38. Scholars have also put forward arguments for abolishing obscenity laws
altogether. See Koppelman supra, note 238, at 1636; Loewy, supra note 238, at 22.
281
See Guernsey, supra note 23, at G1.
282
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002).
283
United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 2009).
284
Id. at 1253–54.
285
Id. at 1252.
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of local community standards for Internet obscenity or indecency,
but not with the use of a national standard.286 Therefore, Fletcher
concluded, five justices concurred in the use of a national
standard—O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer.287
One key problem with Fletcher‘s approach is that the
hesitations expressed by justices O‘Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer
regarding the use of the local standard are not part of the Court‘s
holding but are, as the Little court asserted, dicta.288 Every
hesitation a justice has about other possible scenarios is not a part
of the holding and as Orin Kerr has pointed out, ―concerns are not
positions.‖289 Another problem with Kilbride’s five-justice count
is that, as the Stagliano court highlighted, the justices‘ opinions are
very different from one another. The Thomas group held that
COPA was not overbroad as applied to the Internet because it was
never problematic for variations in local community standards to
exist.290 O‘Connor stressed that the use of local community
standards in Internet cases could be problematic, but that there was
not enough evidence to find it problematic based on what was
before her.291 Kennedy similarly did not believe that there was
sufficient evidence before the court to reach a ruling on COPA‘s
facial constitutionality, but identified possible problems with
applying a community standards approach to the Internet.292
Breyer concurred in the judgment, but for a different reason;
Breyer believed COPA already called for a national standard.293
Therefore, his reasoning is unique to the law before him—
COPA—and is not applicable to other laws that were not before
the Court. Therefore, Judge Fletcher‘s assertion in Kilbride that
five justices—Breyer, O‘Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and

286

Id. at 1254.
Id.
288
United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 164 (11th Cir. 2010).
289
Kerr, supra note 233.
290
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 583 (2002).
291
Id. at 586–87 (O‘Connor, J., concurring). O‘Connor thought, for instance, that
much of the possibly problematic material that the plaintiffs introduced would have
literary, artistic, political or scientific value for minors and would thus be exempted. Id.
292
Id. at 592–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293
Id. at 589 (Breyer, J., concurring). Breyer also acknowledged problems with the use
of a local standard. Id. at 590.
287
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Ginsberg—take the same position in Ashcroft is incorrect.294 Only
four justices take the position she asserts because she wrongfully
included Breyer.
Ashcroft primarily concerned whether COPA was overbroad.295
The argument that COPA was overbroad rested on the premise that
the law suppressed excessive adult material in proportion to the
statute‘s legitimate scope.296 This disparity could be aggravated by
the application of local community standards to the Internet,
exacerbating variations in standards utilized across the nation.297
Because Internet content providers cannot control where they send
their material, a fear of being prosecuted under the act would force
them to cater to the most puritanical communities and could
suppress speech; content could be forced behind age verification
screens or off the Internet entirely.298 This would limit the speech
of adults, and of minors, in more tolerant communities.299
The federal obscenity statutes, coupled with the application of
community standards to the Internet, raise similar concerns.300
However, the obscenity statutes cover less material than COPA.301
The scope of COPA extends to the communication or making
available of harmful material to minors for commercial
purposes.302 The federal obscenity statutes are limited to hardcore
pornography that satisfies the Miller test.303
294

United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240, 1254 (2009).
See generally Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 583.
296
See id. at 609–10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
297
See id. at 593–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
298
See id. at 590 (Breyer, J., concurring); Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299
See id. at 604, 611.
300
See Kagan, supra note 231, at 336–39.
301
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (2006), with 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).
302
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 570. COPA defined material ―harmful to minors‖ as any
content that a jury could find exceeds community standards with respect to minors
through its appeal to the ―prurient interest‖ of minors, ―in a manner patently offensive
with respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or
simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or postpubescent female breast and lacks literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors.‖ See 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
303
See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115 (1974) (―It is plain from the Court
of Appeals‘ description of the brochure involved here that it is a form of hard-core
pornography well within the types of permissibly proscribed depictions described in
Miller.‖); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1974) (overturning obscenity
295
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If COPA was not held to be overbroad because of variations in
community standards in Ashcroft, it stands to reason that the
federal obscenity statutes would not be overbroad because they
apply to less material.304 The Stagliano opinion expressed it best:
―Surely I cannot do to the obscenity statutes what the Supreme
Court was unwilling to do to COPA in the absence of substantial
overbreadth.‖305
It is clear from the opinions in the Ashcroft case that most of
the justices were thinking of the federal obscenity statutes as a
separate category from COPA. Justice Thomas indicated that he
did not believe that the variations in community standards under
COPA for the limited amount of material it covered—namely,
obscene material directed at minors—would be greater than the
variations under the federal obscenity statutes.306 The opinion
postulated that if COPA was unconstitutional because of
community standards, so would the obscenity statutes as ―applied
to the Web‖307 and this would be in tension with Reno, where
appellees conceded that the CDA applied to obscene speech.308
Similarly, Justice Kennedy voted to remand Ashcroft in part
because of the absence of findings as to whether the variations in
community standards under COPA would be any more severe than
variations under the federal obscenity statutes.309 Justice Stevens
dissented because COPA was unconstitutionally broad compared
to traditional adult obscenity laws because it extended to images in
commonplace advertisements and magazines that might be
inappropriate for minors.310
conviction for the film Carnal Knowledge). Miller ―was certainly intended to fix
substantive constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment, on the type of
material subject to such a determination[,]‖ which are inconsistent with a conviction
based ―on a defendant‘s depiction of a woman with a bare midriff.‖ Jenkins, 418 U.S.
160–61.
304
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973).
305
United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2010).
306
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 583–84.
307
See id. at 584.
308
See id.; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997).
309
See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 598–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
310
See id. at 611–12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing material, Justice Stevens
stated, ―[t]he kind of hard-core pornography involved in Hamling, which I assume would
be obscene under any community‘s standard, does not belong on the Internet.‖). It is
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B. Possible Solutions
A national standard is not mandated by case law for obscenity
aimed at adults, and it may be inappropriate from a policy
perspective. There is considerable debate about whether using a
local or national standard will result in meaningfully different
outcomes. Therefore, it may be the case that the problems with
obscenity law are inherent in the community standards approach
itself rather than the varying definition of community standards.
There are strong criticisms of the community standards
approach to obscenity.311 The vagueness and due process
criticisms regarding obscenity on the Internet are in many ways
similar to arguments regarding the enforcement of obscenity law
with respect to previous mediums, including the postal mail in
Hamling and telephone services in Sable. If that were the case,
there would not be a need for a national community standard or a
change in obscenity law because of the Internet, as the policy
problems would not be substantially different than those
encountered in obscenity law in pre-Internet times.
However, it may be that the lack of geographic boundaries and
the accessibility of the vast array of content on the Internet have
created a situation in which the number of communities that
welcome obscene material dwarfs the number of unwelcoming
communities. This has the potential to be an overbreadth problem
of the kind addressed in Reno, where the CDA‘s attempt to protect
minors by limiting adult speech was too restrictive.312
This problem of varying tolerances in different communities
could be solved if there was a perfect technological solution that
allowed Internet providers to target specific communities. Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses can be mapped to a geographic location to

important to note, however, that Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion did apply to adult obscenity.
Id. at 587 (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (―The use of local community standards will cause
problems . . . for adults as well as children in future cases . . . . Where adult speech is
concerned, for instance, there may in fact be a greater degree of disagreement about what
is patently offensive or appeals to the prurient interest.‖).
311
See supra part II.A (discussing criticisms of the obscenity doctrine).
312
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
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limit access to websites.313
Many are familiar with such
restrictions when they unsuccessfully try to access sites with
limited copyright distribution rights, such as video streaming sites
Hulu or Netflix, from foreign jurisdictions.314 In recent years,
courts have considered this technology too imprecise to limit
access to certain jurisdictions or prohibitively expensive.315
However, while it is not perfect, the technology has advanced over
time and studies have demonstrated 85–98 percent accuracy in
identifying the state associated with an IP address.316 A sign of the
increasing acceptance of geolocation technologies is a proposed
federal Internet gambling law, mandating that gambling sites use
these geo-location technologies.317
While a perfect technological solution may be unavailable,
imperfect solutions are already in place involving limitations on
access.318
These methods involve content producers and

313

See Kevin F. King, Geolocation and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet
Gambling’s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM SCI & TECH. L. REV. 41, 58 (2010).
314
See Frequently Asked Questions, HULU.COM, supra note 261 (―Currently, Hulu is a
U.S. service only. . . . To [service other regions] . . . , Hulu must clear the rights for each
show or film in each specific geographic region, which will take time.‖); see also
Frequently Asked Questions, NETFLIX.COM, supra note 261 (last visited Apr. 9, 2011)
(―We currently [only] have the rights to distribute streaming content within the United
States and Canada . . . .‖).
315
Boyce, supra note 8, at 347 (citing ACLU v. Gonzalez, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 820
n.13 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (considering COPA on remand from the Supreme Court)).
316
See King, supra note 314, at 59 (exploring how geolocation technologies could be
used to make Internet gambling regulation more responsive to longstanding federalism
principles).
317
Id. at 63 (providing that the proposed Internet Gambling Regulation, Consumer
Protection, and Enforcement Act ―would require gambling sites to use geolocation
technologies to ensure that the individual placing a bet or wager is physically located in a
jurisdiction that permits Internet gambling . . . .‖).
318
The producers in Thomas required a membership application, including a home
address, before content could be downloaded. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 705
(6th Cir. 1996). The producers in Extreme Associates required a membership form,
which included credit card information, before content could be received by Internet or
postal mail. United States v. Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581–82 (W.D. Pa.
2005). A credit card billing address is not synonymous with a home address, but billing
addresses may correlate with where customers actually live. Billing addresses can be an
imperfect substitute to provide distributors with information to identify the part of the
country from which the recipient originates. This raises the possibility that a customer
could lie about their geographic location. In such an instance, content producers might
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distributors using the internet for teasers and trailers, and then
mailing the full content.319 Content producers and distributors can
require users to provide a residential address or billing address as
part of credit card information.320 This would allow the content
providers to decide whether to send content, by mail, to
jurisdictions where they may not wish to face an obscenity
prosecution. Producers would be able to choose not to do business
with a customer located within a certain community. This
approach would not hinder the ability of adults in welcoming
communities to easily access material, but would prevent at least
the downloading or mailing of obscene content to less welcoming
communities.321 Such imperfect solutions serve a broader goal of
Miller by ensuring that objectionable content is not available—or
at least not readily available—in unwelcoming communities.
Ultimately, real reform in this area of the law will not be
reached by tweaking whether community standards are defined as
local or national in jury instructions. The very notion of varying
communities making different decisions about content across the
country creates a legal structure that is particularly ill-attuned to
distribution mechanisms that at present are particularly insensitive
to geography. Change will only come by more dramatic
alterations to this area of the law. Such alterations may include

conceivably claim they took every reasonable step to ensure the material was being sent
to a certain community and not another.
319
In Little and Stagliano some content was online and openly accessible and some was
shipped by mail. See United States v. Little, 365 F. App‘x 159, 161 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2010).
320
See, e.g., Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705 (involving a membership application that required
a home address); Extreme Assocs., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 581–82 (involving a membership
form that included credit card information).
321
Forcing adults in tolerant communities to encounter paywalls and other screening
devices may raise anonymity concerns of the kind discussed in Ashcroft. See Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004) (upholding the invalidation of COPA as not the least
restrictive way for Congress to protect children on the Internet, considering the existence
of filtering technologies). ―Under a filtering regime, childless adults may gain access to
speech they have a right to see without having to identify themselves or provide their
credit card information.‖ Id. at 667. It is arguable whether the need for anonymity would
be as compelling in a situation involving adults attempting to access adult obscenity as
opposed to content that is unproblematic for adults but problematic for children. In
addition, some of these screening devices may already exist on pornographic websites to
ensure viewers are not minors.
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abolishing the community standards approach to make obscenity a
specifically defined crime with uniform definitions, or repealing
laws aimed at obscenity directed at adults altogether.
CONCLUSION
Courts have long struggled with how to best apply the
community standards approach to regulate obscene material.
Ashcroft did not determine that a national community standard
must be applied to instances of adult obscenity on the Internet. On
the one hand, the logic of community standards suggests that as the
Internet poses a greater danger to intolerant communities, more
measures are justified to prevent that dissemination. However, a
high burden is placed on Internet content providers and
distributors, who cannot effectively limit distribution of their
material to certain locations without functionally keeping it off the
Internet altogether. Ultimately, asking a jury to apply a local or
national standard may be immaterial when community standards
allow every jurisdiction in the nation to make its own decision
about whether a given piece of content is obscene. There may be a
technological solution to improve the ability of the Internet to
reach specific areas of the country, or non-technological solutions
to reach the same result. In the end, more fundamental questions
must be addressed about the validity of the very concept of the
community standards rationale and the obscenity exception to the
First Amendment. Until there is a solution, Internet-based
obscenity distributors will continue to face prosecution in
communities across the nation.

